Hedging, Forward Contracting and Agricultural Credit by Powers, M.
South Dakota State University
Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional
Repository and Information Exchange
Bulletins South Dakota State University AgriculturalExperiment Station
6-1-1968
Hedging, Forward Contracting and Agricultural
Credit
M. Powers
Follow this and additional works at: http://openprairie.sdstate.edu/agexperimentsta_bulletins
This Bulletin is brought to you for free and open access by the South Dakota State University Agricultural Experiment Station at Open PRAIRIE: Open
Public Research Access Institutional Repository and Information Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Bulletins by an authorized
administrator of Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional Repository and Information Exchange. For more information, please
contact michael.biondo@sdstate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Powers, M., "Hedging, Forward Contracting and Agricultural Credit" (1968). Bulletins. Paper 546.
http://openprairie.sdstate.edu/agexperimentsta_bulletins/546
Bulletin 545 June 1968 
Hedging, Forward Contracting 









and Fi rm 5 llllilillllllllllllllilllllllf Ifff lllll 
Hmmmm11mm11111111111111111mmu11mmi.1111111 mmmrnmrnmmmmmm111111mmiimii11111111m1111m111111111m11m1111111���1111�111 ········································: 
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  • ........................................ ·......... · ..... _ ..................................................................................... : ................ · .................................... . 
Economics Department Agricultural Experiment Station 




Summary of Findings____________________________________________________________________________________ 4 
FIRST SECTION-Information and Background Pertaining to the Study 5 
Objectives of the Study________________________________________________________________________ 6 
Review of Literature____________________________________________________________________________ 6 
Theoretical Framework ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 6 
Methodology and Procedure________________________________________________________________ 8 
SECOND SECTION-Extent to Which Credit Agencies Have Made 
Loans on Hedges and Contracts__________________________________________________________ 9 
Extension of Credit to Farmers _____ ------------------------------------------------------ 10 
Extension of Credit to Firms________________________________________________________________ 11 
Reasons for Not Extending Credit to Hedgers and Forward 
Contracts ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 
THIRD SECTION-The Effect of Hedging and Contracting Operations 
on Loans Made to Farmers and Firms ________________________________________________ 13 
Advice Given on Hedging and Forward Contracting Operations 14 
Commodities Hedged or Contracted__________________________________________________ 15 
Loans Made to Hedgers________________________________________________________________________ 16 
FOURTH SECTION-Hedging and Contracting as Aids in Obtaining 
Loans -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17 
Number of Credit Agencies Making Loans to Farmers on the 
Basis of Hedging or Contracting Operations ________________________________ 18 
Amounts of Increase on Livestock__ ______________________________________________________ 18 
Amounts of Increase on Grain______________________________________________________________ 19 
Loans to Firms ________________________________________________________________________________________ 21 
Interest Rates as Related to Hedging and Contracting ____________________ 22 
FIFTH SECTION-Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations __________ 23 
Conclusions -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 24 
Need for Further Research____________________________________________________________________ 24 
Selected Bibliography____________________________________________________________________________ 26 
3 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Seventy-nine of the 376 credit institutions surveyed had made loans 
to farmers who offered hedged or contracted collateral as security for the 
loan. 
The proportion of the production credit associations, small banks 
and large banks that had made loans to farmers offering hedged collat­
eral was not significantly different from the proportions that had made 
loans to farmers offering contracted collateral. 
Significantly greater proportions of the PCAs than banks have made 
loans to farmers on hedged collatera 1. 
Significant! y smaller proportions of small banks than either PCAs or 
large banks have made loans to farmers on hedged and contracted col­
lateral. 
Fifty of the respondent agencies had made loans to agribusiness 
firms on hedged collateral, while 25 of the agencies made such loans on 
contracted collateral, a significant difference. 
It seemed that most credit agencies had not made such loans because 
they had received no requests from farmers or because they did not un­
derstand hedging and forward contracting well enough to know how 
such mechanisms should be used. 
In general, those credit agencies that had made such loans indicated 
that whether the collateral was hedged or contracted or neither made no 
difference in deciding whether to grant a loan to a farmer. A significant 
percentage however, indicated that it did have an effect on the size of 
loan granted. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Hedging, Forward Contracting 
and Agricultural Credit 
By Mark Powers 
Assistant Professor of Economics 
This study was made to determine if hedging and forward con­
tracting by farmers and agribusiness firms enhanced their position to 
borrow money-more specifically, whether lending agencies considered 
the two practices enough of a risk reduction to permit an increase in the 
size of loans made on given assets or to encourage favorable interest rate 
reductions charged such loans. 
In general, it was found that hedging and forward contracting did 
have an effect on the size of loans, but not on the interest rates charged. 
The advent of futures trading in livestock commodities and the in­
creased tendency for producers to contract their production has generat­
ed considerable discussion among economists, businessmen and produc­
ers concerning the implications of these developments on an individual's 
capacity to borrow money. Officials of futures exchanges and of process­
ing firms which offer contractual arrangements have long championed 
futures trading and forward contracting on the basis that these pricing 
mechanisms increase an individual's capacity to borrow money. 
Their argument goes as follows: Any farmer or businessman who 
hedges or forward contracts reduces his risk because he assures himself 
a given price for his production.1 He is assured a given price through 
hedging because the equal but opposite transactions in the cash and fu­
tures market should result in losses in one market being offset by gains 
in the other market. The forward contract stipulates a price to be paid at 
the time of delivery; thus, he is assured a given price. Any farmer or bus­
inessman who reduces his risk in such a way is sure to be considered a 
better risk by lenders. Thus, lenders will be prone to lend greater 
amounts on given collateral. 
Considering the intensified need for capital by farmers and business­
men, research is needed to determine what effect hedging and forward 
contracting might have on one's ability to borrow money. This study is a 
first attempt in that direction and as such it is necessarily exploratory. 
1Hedging is defined as the purchase or sale of a futures contract to offset an equal and opposite 
transaction in the cash market. Forward contracts are non-standardized, private contracts for the 
future delivery of a commodity. In contrast to futures contracts, such contracts are not subject to 
the rules and regulations of an exchange and their price is determined by private bargaining. 
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STUDY OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this study are: 
1. To determine the lending policies of banks and production credit 
associations in South Dakota, Nebraska, Minnesota and Iowa, with 
regard to farmers and agribusiness firms who hedge or contract 
their production. 
2. To determine if hedging and contracting aid the hedger or contract­
or in borrowing money. 
o o o 0 0 0 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The literature relating to the use 
of futures trading and contracting 
in borrowing money is sparse in­
deed. Only one rather limited study 
has been completed which relates 
to the subject. That study, a part of 
a larger study on potato growers and 
credit agencies in Aroostook Coun­
ty, Maine, was concerned primarily 
with determining the number of 
credit agencies in Aroostook Coun­
ty who had made loans to potato 
growers on the basis of hedged po­
tatoes and the total amount of such 
loans.2 
It was found in that study that 9 
of the 21 credit agencies contacted 
made loans to growers on the basis 
of sales of potato futures contracts. 
Such loans for 7 of the 9 agencies 
totaled 8 per cent of the maximum 
amount of grower loans made by the 
21 credit agencies during the season. 
In this same study it was also 
found that fertilizer companies were 
major sources of credit for Maine 
potato growers. Five fertilizer com­
panies reported credit sales of fer­
tilizer to growers on the basis of for­
ward contractual arrangements. The 
value of the fertilizer sold in this 
way exceeded $J� million. No at­
tempt was made to quantify the ef­
fects of hedging on the loan nor the 
interest rate charged. Studies are 
needed to quantify these effects. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Futures trading and forward con­
tracting have long been defended 
and championed on the basis that 
they aid producers in borrowing 
money. This argument stems from 
Hicks' classical theory of risk, for­
ward planning and interest rates. 8 
Hicks, in his discussion of equi­
librium and economic systems, sug­
gests that decision makers act dif­
ferently under risk situations than 
they do in no-risk situations.4 He 
states, " ... when risk is present, 
people will generally act, not upon 
the price which they expect as most 
probable, but as if that price had 
been shifted a little in a direction 
unfavorable to them."5 
Accepting Hicks' logic, it follows 
then that to protect themselves from 
risk of loss due to fluctuations in 
price, creditors have a tendency to 
lend less than the full, expected 
value of assets offered as security on 
loans. For example, if a farmer 
pledges com with an expected mar-
2United States Department of Agriculture, "The 
Economic Importance of Futures Trading in 
Potatoes," Marketing Research Report No. 241, 
AMS. 
sHicks, J. R., Value and Capital, 2nc! edition. 
London: Oxford University Press, 1946. 
4Hicks, J. R., op. cit., p. 135. 
0/bid, p. 134. 
ket value of$1.20perbushel as secu­
rity on a loan, the creditor may loan 
only $1 per bushel. The 20 cent dif­
ference in expected value and loan 
value may be termed the risk pre­
mium. This risk premium tends to 
increase as risk increases. For exam­
ple, if the above creditor thought 
risks were greater, he might lend 
only 90 cents per bushel of corn, 
thereby increasing the risk pre­
mium to 30 cents. 
The problem facing lenders, then, 
is one of uncertainty.6 If a mechan­
ism could be devised to reduce un­
certainty, it follows that lenders 
should be willing to lend a greater 
percentage of the value of given as­
sets pledged for collateral on loans. 
Hicks suggests such a mechanism. 
In the same discussion on equili­
brium, he states: 
"A way does exist, within the 
orbit of private enterprise, 
whereby, expectations and 
plans can be at least partially 
coordinated. This is the device 
of forward trading (including 
not only dealings in forward 
markets, commonly so called, 
but also all orders 'given in ad­
vance, and all long-term con­
tracts)."7 
He is suggesting futures trading 
and forward contracting as methods 
of reducing uncertainty by estab­
lishing prices in advance. He points 
out very distinctly that hedging re­
duces risk. 
"Now there are quite suffi­
cient technical rigidities in the 
process of production to make 
it certain that a number of en­
trepreneurs will want to hedge 
their sales for this reason; sup­
plies in the near future are 
largely governed by decisions 
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taken in the past, so that if 
these planned supplies can be 
covered by forward sales, risk 
is reduced."8 
If risk is actually reduced by 
hedging and forward contracting, 
as has been suggested, it seems logi­
cal that farmers pledging a given 
amount of hedged or forward con­
tracted assets would be able to ob­
tain more credit on these assets 
than if they had not been hedged or 
contracted. The farmers, thereby, 
fix a price, and given expected costs, 
assure themselves a profit margin. 
Further, this would assure a price 
for anyone accepting these assets as 
collateral for a loan, thus reducing 
any risk he would need to assume for 
the possibility of a price reduction 
or a decrease in the value of these 
assets. 
Lenders protect themselves in 
several ways because they are tak­
ing several kinds of risks. One of the 
methods lenders use to protect 
themselves against risk has just been 
mentioned-namely, lending less 
money than the actual value of the 
assets pledged as collateral for the 
loan. A second method involves the 
rate of interest that is charged on 
the loan. Rates of interest depend on 
several things. Hicks points this out 
in his chapter on interest rates. 
"The money rates of interest 
paid for different loans at the 
same date differ from one an­
other for two main reasons: 
(1) because of differences in the 
GKnigh�, F. H., in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. 
Cambndge: Houg_ht?n _Mifflin and Company, 
1921, makes a d1stmct10n between risk and 
uncertainty; however, the terms are used inter­
changeably in this discussion. 
;Hieb, J, R., op. cit., p. 35. 
8fbid., p. 137. 
length of time which the loans 
are to run, and in the way re­
payment is to be distributed 
over time: (2) because of differ­
ences in the risk of default by 
the borrower."9 
Stonier and Hague emphasize the 
important effect risk has on interest 
rates charged. They state: 
"No firm, however reput­
able, can guarantee that 
changes, for example in con­
sumers' tastes, will never affect 
its profits, and the greater risk 
incurred by those who invest in 
commercial bonds means that 
they will demand a greater re­
turn. The more risky the invest­
ment, the higher the return de­
manded.1110 
In short, it is the risk of default by 
the borrower that is responsible for 
the element of risk premium in in­
terest rates. 
In summary, the borrowing ca­
pacity of any individual is limited 
primarily by the risk that he pre­
sents to a lender. This risk takes the 
form of risk of default on the loan, 
and risk of a decrease in the price of 
the assets which are pledged as col­
lateral for the loan. We have seen 
that lenders protect themselves from 
these risks in one of two ways; either 
by lending less than the full market 
value of the assets w h i c h are 
pledged or by charging a higher in­
terest rate. Hicks has suggested 
methods of reducing these types of 
risks, namely, the use of forward 
contracts or futures trading which 
enables a producer to hedge the as­
sets he pledged, to guarantee a 
price, to reduce his risk, and there­
by reduce the risk to the lender. 
METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE 
For purposes of this analysis, the 
credit agencies were divided into 
three categories: large banks, small 
banks and production credit associ­
ations. Large banks were defined as 
those banks having more than $10 
million in total assets. The data used 
in the analysis were collected by a 
series of two mail questionnaires. 
and production credit associations 
( PCAs) have extended credit to 
farmers and agribusiness firms on 
the basis of hedged or forward con­
tracted collateral. If those credit 
agencies had not extended credit to 
borrowers on that basis, the reasons 
why such credit had not been ex­
tended were to be determined. 
The second questionnaire was 
sent to the 102 banks, and 30 pro­
duction credit associations that in­
dicated on the first questionnaire 
that they had extended credit to 
hedgers and forward contractors. 
Twenty-one of the PCAs, 38 of the 
small banks, and 30 large banks re­
turned the questionnaire. 
The first questionnaire was sent 
to a random sample of 440 banks 
drawn from a population of 2,005 
banks listed in Polk's Bank Directory 
for the states of South Dakota, Min­
nesota, Nebraska and Iowa, as well 
as to 65 production credit associa­
tions within these states. Ninety 
large banks, 252 small banks and 53 
production credit associations re-
d h fi . . "Ibid., pp. 142-143. turne t e rst questionnaire. · 
f h . 10Stonic:r, A. W., and Hague, D. C. A Textbook The purpose O t is questionnaire of Economic Theory, New York: Wiley and 
was primarily to determine if banks Sons, Inc., 1953, p. 446. 
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The purpose of this questionnaire 
was to obtain general information 
a bo u t  the borrowers who had 
hedged and contracted, the types of 
loans made to these borrowers and 
whether hedgers and forward con­
tractors received larger loans on 
given assets and/or lower interest 
rates on loans secured by hedged or 
forward contracted collateral. 
To determine the latter factor, 
respondents were given three case 
situations in which they were asked 
to make decisions on the interest 
rates and the percent of asset value 
they would loan. The case situations 
were identical except that in one 
case the individual had not hedged 
or contracted his collateral, the sec­
ond case he had hedged and in the 
• • •  
third case he had forward con­
tracted the collateral. Thus, the re­
sponses should not be considered 
the results of actual loans, but rath­
er the results of what the respond­
ents said they would do if faced 
with this situation. This approach 
was used to isolate the effects of 
hedging and contracting. 
This study is concerned with both 
farmers and agribusiness firm bor­
rowers. For purpose of this research, 
farmers were defined as those in­
volved in producing primary agri­
c u 1 t u r a 1 products. Agribusiness 
firms were defined as those involved 
primarily in purchasing agriculture 
commodities for the purpose of pro­
cessing, storing, or transporting the 
commodities. 
• • •  
Extent 
Agencies 
to Which Credit 
Have Made Loans 
on Hedges and Contracts 
The objectives of this section are: 
1. To determine the extent to which credit agencies have made loans 
to farmers and agribusiness firms on the basis of their hedging or con­
tracting operations. 
2. To determine why those agencies which have not made such loans 
did not. 
The discussions on the extension of credit to farmers and to firms 
have been separated for two main reasons: First, to simplify the presen­
tation and, second, because it is possible that credit agencies may follow 








The data in Table 1 indicate that Table 2. Chi-Square Values Computed 
in all cases the number of credit from Data Presented in Table 1 
agencies which had made loans on 
hedged collateral was greater than 
the number that had made loans on 
f o r w a r d  contracted collateral. 
About one-third of all agencies re­
sponding have made loans on 
hedged collateral or forward con­
tracted collateral. 
Although t!ie numbers varied, 
proportions of the various credit 
agencies which had made loans on 
hedged collateral were approxi-
mately equal to proportions that had 
Chi-Square 
Comparisons Values 
Total Chi-Square ____________________ 39 .949* 
Hedge vs. Forward Contract 1 .2689 
Large 
Banks vs. PCA.s/Hedge______ 5 .606* 
Large 
Banks vs. PCAs/Contract _ .376 
Large Banks and PCAs 
vs. Small Banks/Hedge ____ 2 1 .03 1 * 
Large Banks and PCAs vs. 
Small Banks/Contracts ____ 1 1 .667* 
•significant at .05 level. 
made loans on contracted collateral, traded on futures contracts are agri­
The chi-square value of 1.2689 in cultural products. There was no dif­
Table 2 indicates that there was no ference between the proportion of 
significant difference in these pro- large banks and PCAs that had 
portions between hedged and for- made loans on contracted collateral. 
ward contracted collateral. A significantly smaller proportion 
Greater proportions of the PCAs, of the small banks than of the large 
however, have had experience with banks or PCAs have had experience 
hedgers borrowing money than have in making l o a n s to farmers on 
the large banks. The chi-square hedged collateral as well as con­
value of 5.606 is significant. This can tracted collateral. Both the chi­
be partly explained by the fact that square values of 21.031 and 11.667 
PCAs are likely to have a larger pro- are significant. 
portion of agriculturally related cus- There are several plausible ex­
tomers than do large banks and the planations for these differences. 
agricultural customers are the ones First, it is very possible that the cli-
. who would be using the futures entele of the agencies are different. 
market because most commodities Small country banks are more likely 
Table 1. The Number of PCAs, Large Banks and Small Banks that Have Extended 
Credit to Farmers on the Basis of Hedged or Forward Contracted Collateral 
Hedge Forward Contracts 
Small Large Small Large 
PCAs Banks Banks PC As Banks Banks 
Have 
Extended . Credit ________ 24  34 2 1  1 4  29 1 9  
Have Not 
Extended Credit ________ 28  2 1 0  59 32 200 56 
Totals ___________ _ _____ ____ 52 244 80 46 229 75 
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Table 3. The Number of Large and Small Banks that Have Extended Credit to 
Firms on the Basis of Hedged or Forward Contracted Collateral 
Hedge Forward Contract 
Small Large Small Large 
Banks Banks Banks Banks 




2 1 8  
226 
1 7  
5 8  
75 
Have Not Extended Credit ____________ _ ____ 273 
Totals ______________ ----------------------------- ___ ____ 2 96 
to have smaller farmers as their cus­
tomers while large banks are more 
likely to have larger, more progres­
sive farmers as their customers. 
Often the larger farmers are the ones 
who use the futures market and who 
contract their production. Second, 
large banks are more likely to have 
agricultural credit specialists who 
understand the use of the futures 
market and contracting in reducing 
risk and therefore would urge their 
customers to use such tools. Third, 
PCAs are more likely to get requests 
for such loans because they have a 
larger proportion of farmers as cus­
tomers than do the large banks. 
EXTENSION OF CREDIT TO FIRMS 
Many of the same banks that 
made loans to farmers on the basis 
of the farmers' hedging or contract­
ing arrangements also made such 
loans to agribusiness firms. Since 
PCA.s make loans only to farmers 
they are not included in this section. 
The proportions of the credit 
agencies that have extended credit 
on hedged collateral are signifi­
cantly different from the propor­
tions that have extended credit on 
contracted collateral. A much small­
er proportion of the agencies have 
had experience with forward con­
tracting than with hedging ( see Ta­
b]es 3 and 4) . Part of the reason for 
this difference stems from the fact 
that most of the credit agencies sur-
veyed are located in an area which 
pro<luces commodities for which a 
widespread system of forward con­
tracting has not been developed. 
Futures trading, on the other hand, 
is a highly developed system and is 
easily available for everyone. 
There is also a significant differ­
ence between the proportions of 
small banks and large banks that 
have extended c r e d i t  on both 
hedged and contracted collateral. 
Fewer small banks have made such 
loans than large banks ( see Tables 
3 and 4) . This difference may be at­
tributed to two major factors. First 
there are, undoubtedly, differences 
in the clientele of the different size 
banks. Second, capital requirements 
of agribusiness firms are usually 
quite large compared to capital re­
quirements of farmers. Many small 
banks might not be able to make the 
necessary amounts of capital avail­
able, thus, the firms would tend to 
patronize large banks that could 
supply a complete line of credit. 
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Table 4 .  Chi-Square Values Computed 




Total .Chi-Square __________________ 69.373• 
Hedge vs. Forward Contract 4.284* 
Large Banks vs. 
Small Banks/Hedge __________ 37.8 14* 
Large Banks vs. 
Small Banks/Contract ______ 27.275* 
*Significant at .05 level. 
REASONS FOR NOT EXTENDING CREDIT TO HEDGERS 
AND FORWARD CONTRACTORS 
In all the instances considered 
ahove. more than 50 per cent of all 
the credit agrncies had not extended 
credit on hedged or forward con­
tracted collateral. Since results such 
as this were anticipated, those credit 
agencies which had not extended 
such credit were asked to indicate 
why. 
The overwhelming majority of the 
respondents indicated that they did 
not extend such credit, primarily 
because there were no requests for 
such loans. The data in table 5 
show that 57 per cent of PCAs, 70 
per cent of the small banks, and 67 
per cent of the large banks who re­
sponded to the question had re­
ceived no such requests. A signifi­
cant proportion of the three groups 
also indicated that neither the bank-
ers nor the borrowers understood 
the futures market and forward con­
tracting arrangements well enough 
to use them effectively in actually 
reducing risk. This undoubtedly 
was an important factor in their not 
receiving requests for such loans. 
Responses which were included 
in the category OTHER included: 
"Borrower had hedged but 
was a poor r isk a nyway and  
we d id n't wa nt to  make the 
loa n ." 
"Had suggested the borrow­
ers hedge but they refused to 
do so." 
"Fa rmers have not request­
ed such loa ns because they pre­
fer to gamble." 
"The hedg ing  was not tied to 
a tota l market ing progra m." 
Table 5 .  Reasons why PCAs, Small Banks and Large Banks Have Not 
Extended Credit to Hedgers or Forward Contractors 
PCAs 
No. Per Cent 
A. No requests for such loans __________ 26 56.5 
B.  The borrower did not understand 
the futures market ___ _____________________ 6 13 .0 
C. Our institution has no one who 
understands the futures market 5 J 0.8 
D. Did not think the borrower 
had reduced his risk ____________________ 2 4 .3 
E. Other ---------------------------------------------- 7 1 5 .2 
Totals* ----------------------------------- ________ 46 
•figures are rounded . 
• • • 
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Small Banks 
No. Per Cent 
204 69.6 
33 1 1 .2 
4 1  1 3 .9 
3 1 .0 
1 2  4.0 
293 
• • • 
Large Banks 
No. Per Cent 
55 67.0 
1 0  1 2 . 1  
7 8 .5 
1 1 .2 
9 1 0.9 
82 
The Effect of Hedging and 
Contracting Operations 
on Loans Made to Farmers 
and Firms 
This section analyzes the responses from those credit agencies which 
had made loans on hedged or contracted collateral. 
The objectives of this section are to determine: 
(a) The importance of hedging and forward contracting relative to 
other credit factors. 
(b) Whether these credit agencies required or advised their clients 
to hedge or forward contra(:t. 
( c) What percent of their customers do hedge or contract their pro­
duction. 
( d) What effect hedging and contracting have on interest rates 
charged and size of loans made on given assets. 
The data used in this analysis were obtained from mail question­
naires sent to 132 banks and PCAs in 4 states. Eighty-nine, or 67.4 per 
cent, of the questionnaires were completed and returned. 
For purposes of this analysis the respondents have been divided into 
the five following categories: ( 1) PCAs that extend credit to farmers, (2) 
small banks that extend credit to farmers, ( 3)  small banks that extend 
credit to firms, ( 4) large banks that extend credit to farmers and (5) 
large banks that extend credit to firms. 
Since some of die banks extend credit to both farmers and firms that 
hedge or forward contract commodities, some of the respondents have 
been placed in two categories. 
0 0 0  0 0 0  
HEDGING AND FORWARD CONTRACTtNG AS 
FACTORS IN MAKING LOANS 
In making the decision on wheth- place more emphasis on their inter­
er or not to grant a loan to an indi- pretation of the integrity, the mana­
vidual, most lending agencies do not gerial ability, and the general re­
place much importance on whether payment a b i 1 i t  y ( exclusive of 
the collateral for the loan is hedged hedges or contracts signed) of the 
or forward contracted. Only 3.8 per borrower. In general, the type of 
cent of the respondents considered collateral pledged as security, the 
hedging and contracting as very im- amount of the loan, the current in­
portant considerations when making debtedness of the borrower, the 
such a decision ( see Table 6) . They availability of farm records, the size 
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Table 6. Relative Importance of Factors Considered When Agencies Make Loans 
Very Minor 
Important Important Importance Unimportant Total 
No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. 
1 .  Integrity of borrower 86 96.6 
2. Managerial ability __ 74 83 . 1  
3 .  General repayment 
ability ( exclusive 
of hedges or contracts 
signed ) ____________________ 68 7 6.4 
4 .  Type of collateral 
offered ( i.e., grain, 
livestock) ________________ 1 5  1 7  .0 
5 .  Amount of loan ________ 1 3  1 6.4 
6. Current 
indebtedness ____________ 24 27 .9 
7. Availability of farm 
records ______________________ 8 1 3  . 1  
8 .  Age of borrower ______ 1 1 .8 
9. Size of farm or firm 7 8.0 
1 0 . Forward contracts 
signed by the 
borrower -�---------------- 3 3 .8 
1 1 . Hedging operations 
of the borrower ______ 3 3.8 
12 .  Per cent of income 
spent on living 
expenses __________________ 3 5 . 1  
3 3 .4 
1 4  1 5 .7 
2 1  23 .6 
69 78.4 4 
45 57.0 1 7  
58 67.4 3 
42 68.8 1 0  
22 38 .6 30 
44 50.6 26 
24 30.4 28 
24 30.0 3 1  
38 64.4 1 1  
1 . 1 
4.5 
2 1 .5 4 
3 .5 
1 6 .4 1 
52 .6 4 
29.9 1 0  
35 .4 24 
38.8 22  





5 . 1  79 
1 .2 86 
1 .6 61 
7.0 57 
1 1 .5 87 
30.4 79 
27.5 80 
1 1 .9 59 
of farm or firm and the percentage 
of income spent on living expenses 
are all considered as important 
credit factors. 
ADVICE GIVEN ON HEDGING AND 
FORWARD CONTRACTING 
OPERATIONS 
The decision to hedge or forward 
contract collateral rests on the in­
dividual farmer or firm. None of the 
banks or PCAs required their cus­
tomers to hedge or forward contract 
agricultural commodities pledged 
as collateral for loans, but 24. 1  per 
cent of them advised customers to 
hedge and 18.0 per cent advised 
customers to contract, whenever 
possible ( see Table 7 )  . 
Most of the agencies, 65.8 per 
cent, considered forward contracts 
signed by the borrower and 66.3 per 
cent considered hedging operation 
of the borrower to be of minor im­
portance or relatively unimportant 
factors in deciding whether or not 
to grant an individual a loan. This 
. - ·1ggests that most lenders did not 
regard these methods of reducing 
price risks as being of primary im­
portance in establishing a line of 
credit. 
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This hesitancy on the part of 
credit agencies to make such a stip­
ulation or to give such advice could 
reflect several things. First, it could 
Table 7. Number and Proportion of Credit Agencies That Advise or 
Require Customers to Hedge or Forward Contract 
Require Advise 
Neither 
Require Nor Advise 
No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent 
Total 
No. 
Hedge ---------------------------- ___ _ 
Forward Contract ________ ___ _ 
Totals ----------------------------
be that many credit agencies lack 
confidence in their ability to offer 
such advice. Second, it is possible 
that the credit agencies believe that 
farmers and agribusiness firm man­
agers are so unfamiliar with hedg­
ing and forward contracting as 
methods of reducing risk that to re­
quire or advise them to use these 
· tools without first gaining complete 
knowledge of their use could result 
in some bad experiences for both 
the borrowers and the credit 
agency. 
TYPES OF COMMODITIES AND PER­
CENT AGES OF PRODUCTION 
HEDGED OR CONTRACTED 
The types of agricultural com­
modities hedged and contracted by 
respondents' borrowers varied con-
20 
1 6  
36 
24 . 1  









siderably, ranging from beef and 
hogs to eggs and wheat, to castor 
beans and sunflower seeds. These 
latter two commodities were men­
tioned as forward contracted com­
modities by only one or two PCAs. 
Data presented in Table 8 indi­
cate that hedged and forward con­
tracted beef, hogs, corn and soy­
beans, were pledged as coilateral 
more often than were eggs, wheat 
and potatoes. It also appears that 
conb·acted eggs are used as collat­
eral in more instances than are 
hedged eggs. Further, it seems that 
only a very small per cent of the 
lending agencies' borrowers were 
involved in hedging on contracting 
operations. 
Table 8. Proportion of Borrowers from Lending Agencies Who 
Hedge or Forward Contract Commodities, By Commodity 
Per Cent of Total Borrowers 
Commodities H1 FC H FC H FC H FC H FC H FC H FC H FC H FC H FC 
1 - 10  1 1 -20 21 -30 3 1 -40 41 -50 5 1 -60 61 -70 71-80 8 1 -90 91- 100 
Beef __________ 44 20  
Hogs ________ 1 6  14  
Eggs ________ I 6 
Corn ________ 33 29 
Soybeans __ 25 27 
Wheat ____ 7 3 
Potatoes ____ _ __ _ 





6 I 4 
9 I 8 
1 2 
(Number of Agencies) 
-- 1 
2 -- -- -- -- 2 
15 
-- -- -- 3 
-- I 
-- 3 
Table 9. Proportion of Borrower's Total Production 






1 - 10  -------------------- ----
1 1-20 --------- ---------- 7 
2 1 -30 -------------------- 8 
3 1 -40 -------------------- 2 
4 1-50 -------------------- 19 
5 1 -60 --------------- ·---- 3 
61 -70 -------------------- ----
71 -80 -------------------- 2 1  
8 1 -90 -------------------- ----
91-100 ------------------ 5 
For the bulk of the agencies, less 
than 10 per cent of their borrowers 
were hedging or contracting their 
collateral. Very few agencies had 
more than 30 per cent of their cus­
tomers involved in such operations. 
Only in the cases of eggs and the 
specialty crops of sunflower seeds 
and castor beans, did agencies with 
customers producing such crops 
have 100 per cent of such customers 
forward contracting. It was also in­
dicated by the respondents that all 
of the borrowers who received such 
loans had previously established a 
line of credit with the institution. 
The farmers and firms who had 
obtained loans on hedged or con­
tracted collateral had hedged or 
contracted only a portion of their 
production. Most of them did not 
hedge more than 50 per cent of 
their livestock production and none 
of them hedged more than 80 per 
cent of their grain production. Simi­
larily, with the forward contracted 
collateral, most of the borrowers 
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1 1  
2 
3 
their total production. In only 10 
cases had borrowers hedged or con­
tracted 90-100 per cent of their pro­
duction ( see Table 9 ) .  
TYPES O F  LOANS MADE TO 
HEDGERS 
Whenever a hedger buys or sells 
a futures contract, he must deposit 
some monev with his broker as a 
sign of his ., good faith in fulfilling 
the obligations for which he has 
contracted. This money is called 
"margin money." If the price of the 
contract should move adversely to 
the hedger in the sense that he 
would incur a trading loss if he were 
to close out his futures contract, he 
may be asked to deposit more mar­
gin money as a further sign of his 
good faith. If the price moves in a 
direction favorable to the hedger, 
his margin money will be returned 
to him along with any profits he has 
made at the time he closes out his 
hedge. All of this means that a hedg­
er must have ready cash available 




Table 10. Types of Loans Made to 
Hedgers 
Number 
Loans for Margin Money Onl Y------ 1 3  
Loans for Operation and 
Production Capital Only ____________ 1 7  
Loans for Margin Money and 
Production Capital ______________________ 41 
Total -------------------------------------------- 7 1  
initiates the hedge and during the 
time the hedge is in effect. 
Thus, credit agencies were asked 
whether the loans they had made to 
hedgers were for margin money 
only, operating capital only, or a 
combination of the two. Data in 
Table 10 indicate that most of the 
loans made were for a combination 
of the two. However, in 13 of the 
c a s e s, hedgers evidently had 
enough operating and production 
capital but did not have ready cash 
available for meeting margin re­
quirements. Thus, they received 
loans which were to provide mar­
gin money only. Seventeen hedgers 
received loans which were to be 
• • • 
used for operating and production 
capital only. 
Loans made for purposes of pro­
viding margin money present some 
added problems to lending agen­
cies. One of these problems is con­
cerned with who maintains legal 
authority to terminate the hedge 
when repayment of the loan is 
based on the hedged collateral. If 
the borrower maintains the right to 
terminate the hedge at his discre­
tion, the lender could find his col­
lateral unprotected from price 
change. 
Most of the credit agencies who 
made loans on hedged collateral, 
however, evidently were not too 
concerned about this problem. On­
ly two of the respondents indicated 
that they alone retained the right to 
terminate the hedge. Several indi­
cated it could only be terminated 
by joint agreement and the rest in­
dicated that hedgers were allowed 
to conduct their hedging operations 
as they wished. 
• • •  
Hedging and Contracting 
As Aids in Obtaining Loans 
We now turn our attention to the second major objective of this 
study, to determine whether hedging and forward contracting aid the 
borrower in obtaining loans. This analysis is divided into two major 
parts: 
The first part is concerned with the effect hedging and contracting 
have on the size of loans relative to the market value of the collateral. 
The second part of the analysis deals with the effects of hedging and 
contracting on interest rates. The analysis deals with both farmers and 
agribusiness firms and with both livestock and grain assets. 
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NUMBER OF CREDIT AGENCIES MAKING LOANS TO FARMERS 
ON THE BASIS OF HEDGING OR CONTRACTING OPERATIONS 
vVith about half of the respondent 
credit agencies, a farmer could re­
ceive increased amounts of credit 
if he secured his loan with hedged 
or contracted livestock assets rath­
er than with non-hedged or non­
contracted livestock assets. Twen­
ty-four out of the 45 agencies that 
had made loans on hedged livestock 
and 21 out of the 42 agencies that 
made loans on contracted livestock 
indicated they would increase the 
size of loan ( see Tables 11 and 12 ) .  
The chi-square test indicates 
there is no significai{t difference in 
the responses of the various credit 
agencies, thus indicating that the 
sa me proportion of small banks, 
large banks and PCAs will extend 
greater amounts of credit on 
hedged and forward contracted 
livestock than on non-hedged and 
non-contracted livestock. This sug­
gests that any farmer who hedges 
or contracts his livestock has about 
an equal chance of obtaining in­
creased credit on those assets at any 
of the three classes of credit agen­
cies. 
Hedged and forward contracted 
grain can also be used by farmers 
to gain increased amounts of credit 
on given assets. About three-fifths 
of the respondents indicated they 
would increase the amount loaned 
on hedged grain over non-hedged 
grain and about two-thirds said 
they would do so on contracted 
grain ( see Tables 13 and 14 ) .  The 
chi-square test on the data in Table 
13 indicates that there is no signifi­
cant difference in the proportions 
of PCAs, small banks and large 
banks that would extend increased 
credit to farmers who offered 
hedged grain rather than non­
hedged grain as collateral Similar­
ly, the chi-square value in Table 14 
indicates that there is no significant 
difference in the proportions of the 
various credit agencies that will in­
crease the amount loaned on for­
ward contracted grain. Therefore, 
if a farmer offers hedged or con­
tracted grain as collateral, there is 
about an equal chance that any of 
the three types of agencies will 
offer him increased credit. 
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AMOUNTS OF INCREASE ON 
LIVESTOCK1 1  
The data in Table 15 indicate that 
the average increases in loans on 
h(;dged livestock ranged from 12.2 
per cent to 17.5 per cent of the 
value of assets . On contracted live­
stock the average increases ranged 
from 1 1 .9 per cent to 18.3 per cent. 
All of these increases are signifi­
cantly greater than zero, thus indi­
cating that hedging and forward 
contracting of livestock assets do aid 
the farmer in obtaining capital by 
increasing the amount loaned on 
given livestock assets . 
1 1Anal ysis of variance was used to determine if 
there was a signfi.cant difference between the 
average amounts the various credit agencies in· 
dicated they would loan to farmers who hedge 
or forward contract col l ateral. Preliminary 
analysis of the data indicated that the samples 
had a common variance and it was assumed 
that errors were independent and random, 
thus making analysis of variance applicable. 
Table 1 1. Number of Credit Agencies That Increase Amounts Loaned to 
to Farmers Who Hedge Livestock 
Response PCAs 
Increase Loans __ 8 
Do Not 
Increase Loans ____ 7 
Totals __________________ 1 5  
Computed chi-square= .536 
Level of Signficance= .05 
Small Large 
Banks Banks Totals 
9 7 24 
6 8 2 1  
1 5  1 5  45 
Tabular chi-square= S.991 
Degrees of Freedom=2 
Table 12. Number of Credit Agencies That Increase Amounts Loaned 
to Farmers Who Forward Contract Livestock 





Increase Loans ---------------------------- 7 
Do Not Increase Loans ______________ 6 
8 
7 





2 1  
42  Totals ------------------------------------------ 13  
Computed chi-square= .429 
Level of Significance= .05 
Analysis of variance tests on the 
data in Table 14 indicate that there 
was little difference in the responses 
of the various agencies. The '-'F" 
values shown in Table 16 indicate 
that there was no significant differ­
ence in the average increases the 
agencies would grant on hedged 
livestock as opposed to the average 
increase they would grant on con­
tracted livestock. Thus, suggesting 
that all of the agencies would allow 
about the same increases on hedged 
livestock as they do on contracted 
livestock assets. Further, the data 
indicate that between the agencies, 
Tabular chi-square=S .99 1 
Degrees of Freedom=2 
no difference exists in their re­
sponses on hedged livestock or in 
their responses on contracted live­
stock. Thus, suggesting that a farm­
er would get approximately the 
same increases at each of the agen­
cies, regardless of whether he of­
fered hedged or contracted live­
stock as collateral. 
AMOUNTS OF INCREASE ON 
GRAIN 
There was little variation in the 
average amounts each of the differ­
ent classes of agencies would in­
crease loans on hedged and con-
Table 13. Number of Credit Agencies That Increase Amounts Loaned 
to Farmers Who Hedge Grain 
Small Large 
Response PC As Banks Banks 
Increase Loans -------------------------- 1 0  7 1 0  
Do Not Increase Loans ____________ 7 7 5 
Totals ------------------------------------------ 1 7  1 4  1 5  
Computed chi-square= . 8 1 9  
Level of Significance= .05 
Tabular chi-square=S .991  






Table 14. Number of Credit Agencies That Increase Amounts Loaned 
to Farmers Who Forward Contract Grain 





Increase Loans _________________ _________ 1 1  8 
7 
1 5  
9 
5 
1 4  
28 
1 5  
43 
Do Not Increase Loans __ _ _ _______ ___ 3 
Totals ----------------------------- ------------- 1 4  
Computed chi-square= .363 
Level of Significance= .05 
Tabular chi-square=3 .84 1 
Degrees of Freedom= ! 
Table 15. Average Increases in Amounts Loaned to Farmers on Hedged and 
Contracted Livestock Assets Over Non-Hedged and Non-Contracted 
Livestock Assets, All Credit Agencies 









Hedged vs. Non-Hedged ______________ 1 7.5* 1 2 .2* 1 2 .6* 
Contracted vs. Non-Contracted ____ 1 7.9* 1 1 .9* 1 8.3* 
*Significant at .05 level . 
Table 16. Comparisons and Computed 
Values of Analysis of Variance on Data 
in Table 15 
Table 18 .  Comparisons and Computed 
Values of Analysis of Variance on Data 
in Table 17 
Comparisons 
Computed F Computed F Comparisons Values Values _ _________ _____ _ 
Hedge vs. Forward Contract __ __ .05 1 
PCAs and Large Banks vs. 
Small Banks/Hedge ______________ .395 
PCAs and Large Banks vs. 
Small Banks/Contract __________ 1 . 1 1 0 
PCAs vs. Large Banks/Hedge _ 0.0 
PC As 
vs. Large Banks/Contract______ .680 
Error mean square= 5 . 1 60 
Level of Significance= .05 
Hedge vs. Forward Contract _____ .026 
Large Banks and Small 
Banks vs. PCAs/Hedge __________ . 1 04 
Large Banks and Small 
Banks vs. PCAs/Contract .__ _____ .698 
Large Banks vs. Small 
Banks/Hedge __________________________ .026 
Large Banks vs. Small 
Banks/Contracts ______________________ .28 1  
Error mean square=4 .570 
Level of Significance= .05 
Table 17. Average Increases in Amounts Loaned to Farmers on Hedged and 
Contracted Grain Assets Over Non-Hedged and Non-Contracted Grain 
Assets, All Credit Agencies 
PCAs Small Banks Large Banks 
Methods of Risk Reduction Compared Per Cent 
Hedged vs. Non-Hedged ______________ 10 .9* 
Contracted vs. Non-Contracted ____ 1 1 .4* 






1 5 .9* 
1 9.5* 
tracted grain. The data in Table 17 
indicate that on hedged grain the 
average increases were 10.9 per 
cent by PCAs, 14.3 per cent by 
small banks and 15.9 per cent by 
large banks. On forward contracted 
grain the average increases were : 
PC.As-11 .4 per cent, small banks 
14.,5 per cent, and large banks 19.5 
per cent. All of these increases are 
significantly greater than zero. 
Thus it seems that hedging and for­
ward contracting also increase the 
amounts loaned on gram assets. 
Analysis of variance was also 
used to determine if there was a 
difference in the credit policies of 
PCAs and large and small banks 
with respect to average increases in 
amounts loaned to farmers on the 
basis of hedged or contracted grain. 
The comparisons are similar to 
those made on livestock. The com­
puted "F" values presented in Table 
18 again indicate that PCAs, large 
banks and small banks all extend 
similar increases in amounts loaned 
to farmers who hedge or forward 
contract grain pledged as collateral. 
There not only is no significant dif­
ference when comparisons are 
made between credit agencies con­
sidering the same method of reduc­
ing risk, there also is no significant 
difference between the increases 
due to the risk reducing methods 
themselves. This suggests that the 
credit agencies consider hedging 
and forward contracting as being 
equally useful in reducing price 
risk. 
It can be concluded from this 
analysis, therefore, that farmers 
can expect to get approximately the 
same amount of increase on loans 
secured by hedged or contracted 
grain from PCAs, large banks, and 
small banks. 
LOANS TO FIRMS 
Of the 50 credit agencies who in­
dicated on the first questionnaire 
that they had made loans to agri­
business firms, only 21 responded 
to the second questionnaire. When 
these responses were classified ac­
cording to large and small banks, 
hedged and forward contracted 
grain and livestock, there were not 
enough responses in any one class 
to conduct statistical tests. Never­
theless, the responses are presented 
in Tables 19 and 20. The data sug­
gest that hedging and forward 
contracting do have a positive in­
fluence on the size of loans granted. 
However, since statistical tests can­
not be conducted, an absolute judg­
ment is withheld. 
Table 1 9. Average Increases in Amounts Loaned to Firms on Hedged and 
Contracted Livestock Assets Over Non-Hedged and Non-Contracted 
Livestock Assets, All Credit Agencies 
PCAs Small Banks Large Banks 
Methods of Risk Reduction Compared No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent 
Hedged vs. Non-Hedged ________________ 0 
Contracted vs. Non-Contracted ____ 0 2 
21 




1 5 .0 
27.5 
INTEREST RATES AS RELATED TO HEDGING AND CONTRACTING 
Economic theory as explained 
suggested that the rate of interest 
was dependent upon several factors. 
Inc]uded among the factors was 
risk. It was theorized that if a bor­
rower hedged or contracted the as­
sets he used as collateral for a loan, 
he reduced his risk of loss from price 
change, and that this in turn reduc­
ed risk of the lender. Therefore, if 
interest rates were dependent in 
part on risk and if risk were reduced, 
then interest rates on loans should 
also be reduced. 
Table 19. Average Increases in Amounts Loaned to Firms on Hedged and 
Contracted Livestock Assets Over Non-Hedged and Non-Contracted 
Livestock Assets, All Credit Agenci�s 
PCAs Small Banks Large Banks 
Methods of Risk Reduction Compared No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent 
Hedged vs. Non-Hedged ________________ 0 
Contracted vs.  Non-Contracted ____ 0 2 
1 5 .0 
1 0 .0 
3 
2 
1 5 .0 
27.5 
Table 20. Average Increases in Amounts Loaned to Firms on Hedged and 
Contracted Grain Assets Over Non-Hedged and Non-Contracted Grain 
Assets, All Credit Agencies 
PCAs Small Banks Large Banks 
Methods of Risk Reduction Compared No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent 
Hedged vs.  Non-Hedged ________________ 0 
Contracted vs. Non-Contracted ____ 0 
2 
3 
1 7 .5 
1 5 .0 
6 
2 
1 5 .0 
1 0.0 
Table 21 .  Number of Credit Agencies Which Increase Interest Rates to Farmers on 
Loans Secured by Hedged and Contracted Collateral, All Credit Agencies 
PC As Small Banks Large Banks 
Grain Livestock Grain Livestock Grain Livestock 
Decrease I nterest Rates ------------·--------- 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Do Not Decrease Interest Rates ______ 1 9  1 9  1 6  1 6  1 7  1 7  
Table 22. Number o f  Credit Agencies Which Decrease Interest Rates to Fi�ms on 
Loans Secured by Hedged and Contracted Collateral, All Credit Agencies 
Grain 
Decrease Interest Rates __________________ 0 
Do Not Decrease Interest Rates ____ 0 
The results of this study do not 
appear to substantiate this hypothe­
sis. Analysis of the data in Tables 21 
and 22 indicates that not a single 
agency which had made loans on 
hedged and contracted collateral 
reduced the interest rates on such 
loans. Further, it made no differ­
ence whether the loans were made 







1 4  
0 
1 4  
to  farmers or to  agribusiness firms 
or whether the collateral was 
hedged or contracted livestock or 
grain. Therefore, it appears that 
hedging and contracting have no 
effect on interest rates. 
There are probably three 
major reasons for these results. 
First, some of the lenders prob-
ably believe that hedging and 
forward contr�cti!lg do not re­
duce their risk. Tliis is prob­
ably true of those agencies 
which indicated that they 
would not increase the amount 
loaned on hedged or contract­
ed assets. Those agencies 
which would increase the 
amounts obviously did not 
feel that way. Second, a num-
her of the respondents indicat­
ed that they based the interest 
rate on their cost of money, not 
on the different amounts of 
risk presented ·by farmers or 
firms. Third, it is quite likely 
that the risk reduction has 
been fully accounted for by 
the increase in the size of the 
loan. 
• . .  . . .  
Summary, Conc lus ions and 
Recommendations 
Following J. R. Hicks' theory, many writers, economists and busi­
nessmen have advocated futures trading and contracting arrangements 
on the basis that hedging and forward contracting aid producers in bor­
rowing money. No previous research has been completed which sup­
ports these statements. This study is a step in that direction. 
0 0 0  o o o The analysis of the extent to extended credit on the basis of 
which credit agencies have made hedged or contracted collateral is 
loans on hedges and contracts indi- that they have had no requests for 
cate that about one-third of all re- such loans. A significant proportion 
sponding agencies have made such of the respondents also said they 
loans. The proportions of the vari- had not made such loans because 
ous credit agencies which have either they or the borrower did not 
made loans on hedged collateral understand the use of hedging and 
were approximately equal to the forward contracting as a means of 
proportions that had made loans on reducing risk. This suggests the 
contracted collateral. Significantly need for educating both borrowers 
greater proportions of the PCAs and lenders of the value of reduc­
than the large banks have had ex- ing price risk through proper hedg­
perienc.e with hedgers borrowing ing and forward contracting proce­
money. And significantly smaller dures. 
proportions of the small banks than 
either PCAs or large banks have 
had such experience with both 
hedgers and contractors. Much of 
the differences are undoubtedly 
due to differences in clientele. 
The primary reason why many of 
the various credit agencies have not 
23 
None of the credit agencies re­
quired their farm and firm custom­
ers to hedge or contract collateral, 
although a few advised such an ac­
tion. Hedging and contracting 
were considered to be of minor im­
portance to most of the credit agen-
cies when considering whether or 
not to make a loan to a farmer or 
agribusiness firm. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It appears, therefore, that in 
most cases hedging and forward 
contracting can improve a borrow­
er's line of credit, but cannot be 
considered vital to gaining credit. 
In most cases only a small percent­
age of an agency's borrowers at­
tempted to borrow money on 
hedged or contracted assets and 
usually only a small proportion of 
the borrowers production w a s 
hedged or contracted. 
Although most credit agencies 
indicated that hedging and con­
tracting did not seem to rank as fac­
tors of major importance to a bor­
rower attempting to obtain a loan, 
it was found that a significant num­
ber of the credit agencies would of­
fer significantly larger loans to 
farmers on hedged or contracted 
collateral than on non-contracted or 
non-hedged collateral. Further, it 
made no difference whether the col­
lateral was livestock or grain. Thus, 
it is concluded that hedging and 
forward contracting do aid the 
farmer in obtaining larger loans on 
given assets. It was also found that 
there was no difference among the 
various credit agencies in the 
amount they would increase the 
size of the loan. 
The number of respondent agen­
cies that made loans to agribusiness 
firms on the basis of the firm's 
hedged and contracted collateral 
was so small that it was impossible 
to conduct statistical tests on the 
data. The data from those that did 
24 
respond, however, indicated that 
greater credit would be granted on 
hedged and contracted assets than 
on non-hedged and non-contracted 
assets. 
None of the respondent credit 
agencies indicated that they would 
reduce the interest rates charged on 
loans if the loans were secured by 
hedged or contracted collateral 
rather than by non-hedged or non­
contracted collateral. This was true 
regardless of whether the collateral 
was livestock or grain assets and 
whether the loan was to a farmer or 
an agribusiness firm. 
It is obvious from the above anal­
ysis that many bank managers, PCA 
managers and farmers have had 
limited experience with hedging 
and contracting operations and that 
many of them do not understand 
the use of these tools in reducing 
price risk. This suggests that the fu­
tures exchanges and extension per­
sonnel from the land-grant univer­
sities may have an important re­
sponsibility in educating farmers 
and managers of credit agencies on 
the potential use of these tech­
niques in reducing price risk. 
NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The current study is limited to 
production credit agencies and 
banks. Yet marketing firms and 
farm supply firms are also impor­
tant sources of capital to farmers 
and some of them advance credit to 
growers in return for the promise of 
delivery of part of the crop. For ex­
ample, fertilizer companies often 
enter agreements with farmers for 
the future delivery of a quantity of 
a commodity equal in price to the 
cost of the fertilizer. The fertilizer 
company then hedges the commod­
ity, thus protecting its position. 
More research needs to be con­
ducted to determine the extent to 
which such arrangements are used 
by farmers as a means of obtaining 
capital. 
Further research is also needed 
'>n the use of futures trading and 
contracting not only as an aid in ob-
• • • 
taining capital but also as an inte­
grated part of the management of 
a farm or agribusiness firm. Re­
search is also needed to deter­
mine how lending agencies calcu­
late the risk in a loan, how they cal­
culate the amount of risk that is 
reduced when a borrower hedges or 
contracts, and what price to put on 
this risk. 
• • •  
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